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ABSTRACT: Both the United Kingdom and Hungary run ambitious nuclear power plans to keep 
nuclear power as an important element of their energy mixes. Th e objective of the analysis is to 
identify if there is the intent and the possibility for a diff erent form of public engagement in shaping 
the nuclear future. Th e study builds on the comparative analysis of the cases of Hungary and the 
United Kingdom. Th e ‘communication packages’ theory serves as reference of comparison. Th e study 
fi nds that changing social value sets and communication technology developments create challenges 
to governments in securing support for the nuclear agenda. Th is challenge creates an opportunity 
for members of the public with ‘reluctant acceptance’ of the nuclear agenda. Building on global 
uncertainty, challenges to the prevailing political and economic status quo, together with the grow-
ing infl uence of social media might assist the public to become vocal in their opinions about nucle-
ar energy. 
KEYWORDS: nuclear discourse, disengagement, social values, communication package.
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INTRODUCTION
Th e current study aims to provide an insight and comparison into the public percep-
tion of nuclear energy of the UK and of Hungary. It studies the relevance of the concept 
of  ‘public sphere’ and of  ‘communication packages’ in the context of current, European 
discourse. A critical analysis of relevant theories and of contemporary literature sets 
the context of the study. Th en, a comparative analysis assesses how the UK and the 
Hungarian public resonate to key values relevant to the perception of nuclear energy. 
Furthermore, the wider context of social and technological changes is also considered. 
Th e conclusions indicate a possible direction for the future of nuclear discourse. 
Th e United Kingdom and Hungary envisage ambitious nuclear power develop-
ment in their long-term energy strategies. In both countries the main argument for 
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maintaining and possibly increasing the share of atomic power in the energy mix 
is that nuclear energy provides a reliable, safe, and aff ordable source for electricity 
generation. Proponents of nuclear energy underline the benefi ts of this source, that 
easily outweigh possible risks claimed by opponents. Th e two development plans 
represent comparable cases due to strong and ambitious government commitment, 
their dependence on foreign technology and fi nancing, a high level of politicization 
of the nuclear agenda, and being set against the context of nuclear energy losing its 
role against renewable energy sources (Schneider et al., 2017). Primarily, the per-
ception of benefi ts and risks determine support or opposition to nuclear power 
(Eiser et al., 1990).
Nuclear energy in the United Kingdom
Th e UK is home to an ambitious nuclear development program that focuses on 
the replacement of aging nuclear power capacity through the installation of new 
nuclear power stations. Th e Long Term Nuclear Energy Strategy (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, DECC, 2013) considers nuclear energy, next to renew-
ables and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (DECC, 2013, p. 5) the fundamental 
elements of the energy mix. Th e government sees the role of nuclear as ‘delivering 
a much larger amount of generation than that available now, with the potential to 
deliver up to 75 GW of the UK’s energy needs’ (DECC, 2013, p. 6). Fourteen of the 
current fi ft een reactors would see their original life cycle expire soon, and will 
probably need their life cycle extended. Replacement of ageing plants will need 
signifi cant development of nuclear power generation capacities, increasing the 
share of nuclear power in energy generation requires installation of further new 
capacities. Both the current and planned number of nuclear power plants (Schneider 
et al., 2016) and the 21% total share of nuclear energy (World Nuclear Industry 
Status Report, 2016) makes the country, by planned total nuclear output, one of the 
signifi cant producers and users of nuclear energy in Europe. 
Th e nuclear development program builds heavily on the involvement of foreign 
fi nancing and technology. With no restriction on foreign equity and technology, 
the ambitious nuclear development program and the installation of new nuclear 
power stations relies heavily on the involvement of French, Chinese, Korean and 
Japanese technology and fi nancing. 
In contrast to a number of other European countries, the Fukushima accident 
in 2011 did not have any signifi cant impact on government nuclear policies and the 
commitment to nuclear energy build-up. Tightening of security standards, a more 
thorough risk analysis process and the consequent rise in planning, fi nancing, 
building, and operational costs match global trends. 
Nuclear energy in Hungary
With four reactors, Hungary’s nuclear power capacity is focused in the city of 
Paks, providing approximately 50 per cent of the electric power needs of the coun-
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try. Th e current plant would see its closure in the mid-2030s. Earlier, the govern-
ment proposed plans to have two new on-site reactors built, and in March 2009 the 
plan received approval by the Hungarian Parliament. Th e National Energy Strategy 
2030 (Nemzeti Fejlesztési Minisztérium, 2012), approved by the government in 
2012, puts ‘Atom — Coal — Green’ in its focus. With this expansion the share of 
nuclear energy will rise to 53 percent (World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 2016) 
and Hungary will stay among the important users of nuclear energy in Europe. Th e 
government perceives this move as a lifetime extension, while opponents to the pro-
gram see it as a de facto expansion of nuclear capacities.
Th e extension/expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant is based on Russian 
involvement. Technology and a signifi cant part of the actual construction are sup-
plied by Rosatom, while, fi nancing up to the extent of 80 per cent is covered through 
a credit from the Russian state-owned VEB bank. Th e government awarded build-
ing and fi nancing rights directly to Russian partners. 
METHODOLOGY
Th e situation of the nuclear programs of the United Kingdom and Hungary is 
identifi ed through comparative analysis. Th e choice of comparative analysis refl ects 
the signifi cant similarities of the nuclear cases in both countries, in terms of their 
ambition, political support, scope, and reliance on foreign involvement. Th e analy-
sis tests the validity of the Gamson — Modigliani model within the current polit-
ical and social conditions in the two countries. 
Th e model (Gamson, Modigliani, 1989) creates a comprehensive framework of 
requirements for credible communication packages in the fi eld of nuclear energy. 
Th e model looks at the main periods of nuclear communication: the post war per-
iod where nuclear energy was envisaged as the symbol of modern and robust de-
velopment, the rise of the anti-nuclear movement in North America and Western 
Europe in the 1960s and 70s, and the accidents of Th ree Mile Island in 1979 and in 
Chernobyl in 1986, resulting in fractures in the myth of the supremacy of nuclear 
energy. 
To interpret the relevance of the model today, validity checking is combined 
with the comparative analysis of the cases of the UK and Hungary. Th e three cri-
teria of the Gamson-Modigliani model defi ning the critical factors of credible 
“communication packages” allow for a step-by-step analysis of nuclear communi-
cation in the two countries.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the analysis of media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power, Gamson 
and Modigliani (1989) label the complex set of communication elements, including 
claims, catchphrases, metaphors, symbolic elements, and visual pictures as ‘pack-
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ages’. Various issues have their set of competing communication packages, and 
giving preference to one over the other is the decisive factor in actually winning 
public support. Having competing packages is a necessary prerequisite of open 
discourse, but, in the case of nuclear power, the authors claim that with public of-
fi cials being the ‘sponsors’ of nuclear policy and communication, open discourse 
is made diffi  cult. Furthermore, Gamson and Modigliani argue that every policy 
issue and discussion has its own culture, therefore relevant discourse is specifi c and 
characteristic to nuclear energy itself.
Kinsella identifi es four important characteristics of the nuclear sphere. In his 
work about the history of nuclear discourse in the USA (Kinsella, 2005) mystery, 
entelechy, potency, and secrecy are seen as the main descriptors of nuclear com-
munication. Th e positioning of nuclear energy as something that is ‘off  limits’ to 
the everyday person creates a unique position to this type of energy source. Use 
of the four main themes set restrictions on the discourse, and contribute to the 
creation of ‘docile citizens’, implying that the issue of nuclear energy is too com-
plex, important, and specialist knowledge intensive, than to leave it with the 
public. 
Catellani (2012) reiterates the fi ndings of Kinsella and confi rms its relevance in 
the European context. Catellani argues that in the fi eld of nuclear discourse the 
actual disempowerment of the European citizen has taken place. Members of 
the public are not given any opportunity to take part in the nuclear discourse 
and the actual decision-making. Catellani supports Kinsella’s notion of the domin-
ance of the modernistic narrative, positioning nuclear energy as a ‘guarantee’ to 
modernization, growth, and development, in both economic and social terms. In 
reference to Umberto Eco (1976), Catellani urges the adoption of non-ideological 
persuasive statements, to build open and transparent discourse in the fi eld.
Th e discourse can be set in a diff erent context in the light of energy transition 
(Wagner et al., 2016). In this interpretation the reconceptualizing of the production 
and use of energy should not only refer to its technological-economic context, but 
also to its social conceptualization. Wagner et al. claim that in the period of energy 
transition public thinking is going through a signifi cant transformation, con-
sequently it should be involved in the relevant discourse. Th ey confi rm that a strong 
distinction exists between micro and macro theories of deliberative democracy 
(Hendriks, 2006; Lehtonen, 2010), arguing that actual discourse appears on the 
micro level with higher probability than on the macro level. Small group sizes 
and  transparent conditions can maximize effi  ciency of the discourse, while on 
the macro-level, the complexity of the issue, the number of actors involved and the 
complexity of interrelated discourses create a considerable challenge to public dis-
course. Th e strong distinction is further validated by underlining a signifi cant dif-
ference in the context of the state (Hendriks, 2006). Micro deliberation is described 
as a range of collaborative practices, with and within the state framework, while 
theorists of macro deliberation grant validity to the discourse as long as it takes 
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place outside and against the state. In conclusion, Wagner et al. raise signifi cant 
doubts regarding the possibility of an open discourse on nuclear related matters.
DISCUSSION
Gamson-Modigliani model, criteria 1: 
Communication packages on nuclear energy culturally need to fi t well 
In the United Kingdom the strong political drive towards nuclear energy is 
matched by limited public support. In three of the seventeen pieces of research 
overviewed by a British Parliament committee, the majority showed a clear but 
conditional support to nuclear energy, eight refl ected a division of public attitudes, 
while in a further six the majority refused the extended use of nuclear energy (Sar-
los, 2015a). Analysis of the research results demonstrates that, especially when set 
in the context of climate change, the population indicates ‘it can live with nuclear 
energy’, but expresses ‘reluctant acceptance’ (Bickerstaff  et al., 2008). Th is is elabor-
ated further by arguing that due to the complexity of the issue, changing public 
opinion on nuclear issues is not simply a task of disseminating public information 
(Corner et al., 2011). Reframing the issue in the context of climate change or energy 
security has limited scope only. Th at part of the public that, due to its individual 
value set, has an issue with nuclear energy, will not become supportive of atomic 
power. Due to individual cognitive dissonance and controversies in the con-
text of climate change, new systems of communication are envisaged (Bickerstaff  
et al., 2008). 
In the UK the Fukushima accident left  the level of public support for nuclear 
energy intact. Following a dive in June 2011, support for nuclear energy regained 
and in fact, actually surpassed its previous level (Wallard et al., 2012, p. 8). Experts 
claim that in the UK there has hardly been any ‘Fukushima eff ect’ at all (Knight, 
2012). In researching the value components of the UK nuclear discourse, it is 
claimed that the issue of trust is the critical value defi ning public discourse (Sarlos, 
2015a). A range of authors (Renn and Levine, 1991; Johnson, 1999; Poortinga and 
Pidgeon, 2003b; Poortinga et al., 2006) confi rm that trust in the UK government 
and the regulatory authorities is essential in having, even if of a reluctant nature, 
support for nuclear energy.
Th e issue of trust resonates further in recent developments as well. Most specif-
ically the issue of the Hinkley Point C project, the leading element of the UK ‘nu-
clear renaissance’ seems to have a strong imprint on how the public perceives 
nuclear energy. Uncertainties regarding the involvement of the French company 
EDF and Areva as well as Chinese CGNPC in the fi nancial and technological real-
ization of the plan have raised signifi cant public concerns. Public deliberation re-
garding the viability of the project and the investigation into whether the partners 
can be trusted in political, technological, and fi nancial terms casts a far reaching 
shadow on the project. 
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In Hungary the focus of the ‘communication package’ of the government-dom-
inated communication is about energy security. Th e benefi ts and value of security 
in general, and specifi cally of energy security resonate well with the wider public. 
Energy security is interpreted as access to a steady fl ow of energy at aff ordable 
prices to the public (IEA, 2017). In the political discourse, energy security is oft en 
linked to the concept of (energy) independence or energy self-reliance. Security in 
these cases is positioned as a matter of national priority (Genys, 2013). Th e govern-
ment communication packages on nuclear energy refer to the development of Hun-
garian nuclear capabilities through the extension of the Paks nuclear power plant, 
as a key prerequisite to meeting the electricity needs of the public and of industrial 
modernization.
Opinion polls in Hungary provide a complex insight into the public stand on 
the issue of nuclear energy. Due to diff erences in methodology, commissioning 
organization, wording, order of questions and interpretation of results, opinion 
polls oft en diff er in the conclusions (Sarlos, 2015b). Th is confi rms research about 
challenges related to the complexity of polling on nuclear energy related issues and 
the extreme importance of specifi c wordings (Mitchell, 1980; Nealey et al., 1983). 
Analysis of the government-dominated communication and the low level of public 
involvement in the issue indicate a ‘disengaged acceptance’ of the nuclear develop-
ment program.
Comparing value systems of the United Kingdom and Hungary contribute to 
the understanding of the context in the research of the cultural fi t of communica-
tion packages.
A comparison of the value systems of the two countries is based on the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS). Th e initiative, set up by the European Commission in 
2002, allows for a comparative research in geographical and longitudinal terms. 
Th e survey provides comparative data about the social and demographic situa-
tion, the political and public preferences, and the attitudes of the population of the 
member countries.1
Th e authors of this study explored further the issues of security, safety, nature, 
environment, and the role of government through further data analysis. Respondents 
had to express to what extent they felt themselves similar to a person, making the 
following claims: Important to live in secure and safety surroundings”, “Important 
that the government is strong and ensures safety”, and “Important to care for na-
ture and environment”. Possible answers were the following: “Very much like me”, 
“Like me”, “Somewhat like me”, “A little like me”, “Not like me”, “Not like me at 
1  Th e bi-yearly survey reveals information about changes in value sets in the respective coun-
tries. Th e research is representative by age, residence, and qualifi cation, the size of the individual 
sample range between 1500 and 2000 in the various countries. Data collection is done through 
personal interviews at the domicile of the respondents, who are chosen based on random sampling. 
Respondents could express their views through providing answers to the closed questions, responses 
were ranked along a Likert scale.
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all”. To ease interpretation of the data, authors transformed the scale further to 
three grades: the fi rst two, the middle two and the last two options were con-
sequently merged. 
Figure 1. Important to live in secure and safe surroundings — HU, UK (in percent)
Source: Authors.
Living in a safe and secure environment has been a long-standing, standard 
value in Hungary, only a small part of the respondents do not identify with 
this value. For citizens of the United Kingdom, living in a safe and secure environ-
ment is of less importance. Th ere are fewer people with full agreement to the 
statement than in Hungary, while those who somewhat agree or do not agree with 
the statement exceed those of their Hungarian counterparts (Figure 1). Further-
more, longitudinally the UK responses refl ect certain fl uctuation. In the case of 
Hungary, earlier pieces of research (Róbert & Nagy, 1998) confi rm public expect-
ance of a high level of state involvement in public issues. Th is is primarily due to 
the legacy of the ‘Communist’ period with its paternalist thinking, and the loss of 
security, increase in unemployment and general social decline following the chan-
ges in 1990. 
Th is attitude is confi rmed when the issue of government involvement is ad-
dressed (Figure 2). Along the full period between 2002 and 2014, members of the 
Hungarian population clearly express a strong desire for security provided by 
the government. About three quarters of the population share these views, while 
a further quarter or fi ft h are hesitant. Over the period, only a marginal part of the 
respondents (3–5%) indicate that they do not expect a strong government presence 
and providing of security.
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Figure 2. Important that the government is strong and ensures safety — HU, UK (in percent)
Source: Authors.
In contrast to this desire for stability, the answers from the United Kingdom 
refl ect changes in attitudes. Until 2012 there was a constant rise in the proportion 
of those who were looking forward to a strong government. Development of this 
trend was parallel to the gradual decrease in those being hesitant about this issue. 
Until 2012, those denying the need for a strong state represent a constant 8%, then 
their share dropped by half, just to re-emerge and more than double within 2 years. 
In spite of the growing desire for the involvement of the state, it still ‘lags behind’ 
the results in Hungary. Again, value levels in the United Kingdom show signs of 
fl uctuation in the last few years.
Th e third question discussed the attitude to the environment. For a long time, 
care for nature and the environment has been a highly regarded value in Hungary, 
at least on the level of attitudes. In the same period, the United Kingdom has seen 
a gradual increase in the importance of caring for the environment. In both coun-
tries, only a marginal part of the population states that they would not care about 
nature and the environment (Figure 3).
In summary, the Hungarian public considers security and safety signifi cant-
ly more important than the UK public, fi nds a strong government providing 
safety more important than those living in the UK, and consider themselves 
more caring for nature and the environment than UK citizens do. Furthermore, 
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value systems in the UK appear to fl uctuate more signifi cantly than they do in 
Hungary.
Propelled by a range of political, economic, social, and cultural factors, public 
concerns are raised globally in a variety of fi elds. Th e fundamental fabric of trust in 
government, institutions, media, businesses, and NGOs is shaking, the ‘population 
rejects established authority’ (Edelman, 2017). Nuclear energy is oft en pictured as 
a symbol of political elitism, with governments being the main drivers behind the 
development programs. It is to be seen if the issue of nuclear energy, as a ‘part of 
the traditional representation of the elite’ remains untouched in the rise against elit-
ism. A fracture might emerge between shift ing of fundamental global values and the 
rigidity of value sets related to nuclear energy. In the interpretation where mystery, 
entelechy, potency, and secrecy are the main characteristics of nuclear energy (Kin-
sella 2005), it is to be seen if the ‘white elephant’ of nuclear energy remains intact. 
Th e core values of trust and security identifi ed in the United Kingdom and in 
Hungary might see changes in the future, as already by indications of change since 
2012. Arguably, the world is entering an age of uncertainty where signifi cant as-
pects of life are strongly aff ected by fundamental actual and cognitive changes. In 
an age of growing uncertainty, where people lose their grip with the constant fac-
tors of their life, there is a growing search for elements they can trust and elements 
that provide security in their life. Centralized authoritarian structures and decen-
tralized micro-society focused solutions can both become attractive models, it is 
yet to be seen where nuclear energy fi ts in this situation.
Figure 3. Important to care for nature and the environment — HU, UK (in percent)
Source: Authors.
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Gamson-Modigliani model, Criteria 2: 
‘Communication packages’ need to have sponsors with interest in the given package
Development and implementation of nuclear energy policies and programs have 
always relied on government initiatives and involvement. Th e period of nuclear 
armament, followed by the decades of the ‘peaceful atom’, reactions to the emer-
gence of the anti-nuclear movement, the resonance of the Th ree Mile Island, Cher-
nobyl, and Fukushima accidents all carry proof that nuclear power development 
presupposes state initiative, governance and control. In the post-Fukushima period, 
governments have taken an even more critical role in redesigning and tightening 
security measures for nuclear power plants. Tightened safety and security measures 
for planning and building nuclear power plants resulted in extension of timeframes 
and delays in processes. Investors are looking for additional guarantees to secure 
their returns, ultimately leading to the demand of state guarantees against risks 
in the form of additional insurance, retail electricity prices set on a long term and 
coverage by state guarantee. State involvement is the only reason why and how 
nuclear power development plans can become viable (Schneider et al., 2017). Th is 
further increases the role of governments and secures their on-going vested interest 
in the success of these developments.
In the fi eld of energy policy, the United Kingdom balances traditionally between 
market forces and the drive for central control (Keay, 2016). Government plans are 
oft en tied up in contradictory objectives and in the end, with the ambition of letting 
both market forces and central control rule, result in usually highly priced com-
mitments (Keay, 2016). It has been demonstrated to members of the European Par-
liament, that Hinkley Point, with the UK government agreeing to future buying of 
electric power at £92.5/MWh, together with indexation to infl ation and to be re-
viewed at a period of 15 and 25 years, has agreed to unnecessarily high concessions, 
and took on itself critical levels of risk that are diffi  cult to assess (Th omas, 2015).
Th e government has a strong interest in the success of the communication pack-
age, however, the most important argument for nuclear energy, however, the case 
of climate change seems to stand less and less fi rm. Th e environmentally strongly 
committed part of the public does not approve nuclear energy as an alternative, 
and their concern about climate change, together with energy security, has a lim-
ited impact on increasing agreement to the use of nuclear energy (Corner et al., 
2011). Th e business case is burdened by the fi nancial issues of international, pri-
marily the French investors, and the political case is questioned due to the exposure 
to foreign, primarily Chinese infl uence. All this is challenged further by the fast 
technological rise and steep cost decrease of renewable energy sources, which in 
the end means a growing competition for nuclear energy. All of these have an im-
pact to a possible decrease in government dedication to the sponsorship of this 
communication package.
Especially since signing the agreement on relying on Russian technology and 
fi nancing, the Hungarian government has been the key supporter of the nuclear 
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communication package, and it has been the driver of the discourse. Govern-
ment communication builds on the fundamental messages of self-reliance and 
energy independence, even if both nuclear technology and fuel are import sources. 
To some extent it can also use the involvement of state owned Russian companies 
and banks to symbolize the “anti-Brussels” nationalism of the Hungarian govern-
ment. In its current state, with disengaged acceptance and ignorance of the issue 
by the wider public, and the de facto low profi le in the media and keeping it within 
the elitist — political array (Wagner et al., 2016), the nuclear business seems to be 
continuing as usual.
In the messaging, the government does not overemphasize the role Russia plays 
in the development, even if it has its interest in keeping Russia capable of meeting 
its commitment, and deliver the new reactors by the deadline and within the agreed 
fi nancial framework. Th e former is questioned by signifi cant delays and fi nancial 
turmoil of internationally comparable projects, such as Olkiluoto in Finland and 
Flamanville in France, while the latter is challenged by uncertainties about the 
solvency of Russian fi nancial institutions.
Th e post-Fukushima changes of the nuclear scene have not left  the United King-
dom and Hungary unaff ected. While public support and opposition does not seem 
to refl ect on the 2011 accident, the general rise in uncertainties leave an imprint on 
government commitments. Increased risks, additional budgetary requirements, 
extended planning and construction times and increased state involvement have 
all caused governments to be more cautious. While the commitment of the UK and 
Hungarian government to the nuclear agenda might be unchanged, there are signs 
of caution by keeping a more modest public stance on nuclear issues. Th e intent is 
clearly to keep the issue in the realms of technical — technological — energy policy 
issues and not to expose it in the public discourse.
Gamson-Modigliani model, Criteria 3: 
Communication packages need to fi t the relevant media patterns
Two contradictory trends can be noted in reviewing media acceptance of nucle-
ar energy. Independent media tend to deliver a more accurate account on the pos-
sible risks of nuclear energy and their account on accidents tends to be more and 
more accurate. However, having strong commercial interests might as well lead to 
inaccuracies in favor of publicity, through exaggeration or search of sensationalism. 
On the other hand, media under signifi cant government infl uence might have bet-
ter access to factual information, but still, might modify or limit its output of in-
formation about risks and accidents (Perko, 2011). Traditionally, media patterns tell 
that media more sympathetic to actual pro-nuclear governments are inclined to 
underline the benefi ts, while media with a critical approach to nuclear energy and 
the government rather emphasize the risks. 
Traditional media patterns are being challenged by fundamental changes in 
media ownership, structure, and technology. Social media may open new channels 
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of communication and requires diff erent attitudes. In overall terms, the rise of 
social media could allow for the emergence of a diversity of views, by allowing 
everyone equal access to information. Internet and social media have achieved a dis-
tinguished role in becoming whistle-blowers regarding transparency in nuclear 
issues. While before the internet era, strong government control prevailed on most 
media on nuclear-related issues, this grip had to loosen with the rise of widely avail-
able internet and social media (Friedman, 2011). With Fukushima being the fi rst 
major accident in the ‘digital age’, social media has played a signifi cant role in shap-
ing perception and possibly future policies of nuclear energy.
Nuclear topics seem to be viewed as niche issues, to which people have diffi  cul-
ties to relate to or engage with. Th is confi rms other areas of research, that nuclear 
concerns are not high on the public agenda. All this might not lead towards the 
nuclear agenda becoming a topic for social media. Furthermore, in the ‘post-truth’ 
era it is becoming growingly apparent that through emission of large amounts of 
biased information, as well as through the manipulation of social media logarithms, 
information can be distorted and manipulated. Th is might question nuclear re-
lated information accessed on the internet and in social media, and cast a shadow 
on sources for reliable information in possible critical periods.
Th e UK has traditionally enjoyed a high level of freedom of the media. As an 
overall policy, journalism tends to keep its distance from politics and polit-
icians, and it has a strong commitment to serve society as the representative of 
the ‘Fourth Estate’. Editorial freedom allows for the appearance of a plethora 
of views, making both pieces of news information and a range of possible inter-
pretations both available (Brüggemann et al., 2014). In the Fukushima case on 
the spot reporters and back offi  ce editorial writers oft en had contradictory views 
published. In comparison to some other European countries, the accident in 
Japan was covered modestly in the United Kingdom and without any indication 
that it could have a direct relevance to the nuclear agenda (Kepplinger & Lenke, 
2016). Th e biggest challenge in the UK for nuclear-related communication pack-
ages to match the relevant media patterns are the changing media patterns 
themselves. Th e traditional approach of the government and the media, based 
on respect and acceptance, might become under pressure in case the nuclear 
issues get more focus. In a critical situation, be it for political, fi nancial, or 
technological reasons, the use of social media might become more viable and in 
demand.
In Hungary, media has been under constant pressure of three critical and oft en 
contradictory factors: government infl uence, commercial interests and independ-
ent journalism. Since 2010, a signifi cant shift  has been taking place where a growing 
part of the traditional and online media landed under strong government infl uence 
(Wilkin, 2016). In fact, the Hungarian government and the ruling FIDESZ party 
have acquired a dominant position to push its communication packages in the 
media. Hungary is considered a ‘classic case of media capture, where the govern-
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ment has used policy and public funding to turn independent media into a mere 
government establishment’ (Dragomir, 2017).
Media attitudes to the nuclear development plan of the country refl ect the pol-
itical sympathy or even affi  liation of the given media (Sarlos, 2015a). Th e balance 
between risks and benefi ts of the Paks development plans is a refl ection of where 
the given paper stands in terms of its editorial policy. Critics of the nuclear program 
are labeled in the media as opponents to the principles of “national self-reliance” 
and “energy independence” and, in general, positioned as “aliens” (Sarlos, 2015c). 
Th e emergence of political alienism (Szabó, 2006) demonstrates a growing public 
split on a range of issues, and the subject of the nuclear issue might easily land 
among these issues.
Findings of this analysis coincide with fi ndings from Lithuania and Poland 
(Genys, 2013; Wagner et al., 2016), due to contextual similarities, including history, 
traditions, and role of media. Similar splits are confi rmed by analyses of nuclear 
discourses in Belgium, Italy, and France (Catellani, 2012).
Traditional media patterns face two diff erent challenges. First, the massive 
technological changes result in the decreasing importance of traditional media and 
contribute to the rise of social media. However, in neither of the two countries does 
nuclear energy appear to rank high on social media. 
Second, the role of government in representing the nuclear case in media diff ers 
signifi cantly. In the UK the government represents the nuclear agenda to the media 
and media would deal with it at its liberty, while in Hungary, the government exer-
cises pressure on the media so that it represents the ambitious development pro-
gram. Both models seem to fi t the relevant media patterns of the country, and re-
fl ect a characteristic relationship between the government and media. Analysis of 
media confi rms that the nuclear discourse has been “protected by an institutional 
web of social and technological practices. Such institutional structures and belief 
systems engender a restricted view of the scope for public discussion and demo-
cratic involvement within nuclear decision-making” (Irwin in Irwin et al., 2000, 
p. 83). In case the social media becomes interested and involved in the topic of 
nuclear energy, it might become the new forum for nuclear energy.
In a wider context, the post-Fukushima eff ect to the perceived infallibility of 
nuclear power, together with the global value changes taking place might challenge 
the existing status quo of nuclear energy. In a context of global and local uncertain-
ties, safety, and security, together with the notion of a strong government, become 
imperative. Non-understanding of the complex issue of nuclear energy, together 
with the search for security might reinforce the dominance of the ‘reluctant accept-
ance’ attitude in case of the understanding of the issue. Non-interest in the issue 
rather leads to the model of ‘disengaged acceptance’. As it is in the interest of gov-
ernments to keep the nuclear agendas unchallenged, they might encourage further 
disengagement in the issue by framing it as a safe and secure solution, all guaran-
teed by a strong state and government. 
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However, the rise in the infl uence of climate skeptics may dilute the power of 
argumentation that nuclear energy is a carbon-free option, global challenges to 
elitism and politician power could weaken governments and their nuclear plans, 
traditional patterns of political representation, elections and decision making are 
changing, and being based on foreign involvement, political disputes and fi nancing 
issues can possibly put most projects at risk.
CONCLUSIONS
By giving a blast to nuclear plans, Fukushima induced a new period for nuclear 
power development plans and for related government powered communication. It 
led directly to several countries revising their nuclear development plans, redesign 
of the safety requirements of nuclear power plants, and a consequent signifi cant 
increase in the length of planning and construction times and of fi nancial needs. 
Th e increase in risks and costs resulted in a major international revision of com-
mitments to nuclear development programs, with some countries abandoning their 
nuclear energy programs, while others reconfi rmed theirs. Th e United Kingdom 
and Hungary both reiterated their dedication to continue with their plans. 
Nuclear-related communication models will not remain intact. In line with the 
Gamson-Modigliani model, governments, if they want to continue maintaining cred-
ibility of nuclear communication, will need to redesign their communication pack-
ages. Th ey need to refl ect on the imminent changes in the respective value systems. 
Th ey need to redesign their tools to engage with the public that currently increas-
ingly manifests an attitude of ‘reluctant acceptance’ and ‘disengaged acceptance’. 
Global value changes and challenges to the current status quo, including the 
dramatic drop in public trust, the elementary changes in the global media land-
scape, the imminent challenges to communication in the post-truth era and the 
strong shift  in infl uence from traditional to social media will fundamentally reshape 
media patterns for nuclear communication. From the public perspective, signifi cant 
changes in values, the context and content of nuclear communication, together with 
the media patterns open up new opportunities. Th is call for new platforms for pub-
lic discourse on nuclear energy. Social media could become the new frontier for any 
public discourse on nuclear energy, and it can serve as a signifi cant driver for future 
social changes, with a strong possible eff ect on the use of nuclear energy. 
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